Decisions · Partners and channel
Should your loyalty programme reward competing channels
No. A single-brand loyalty programme should not issue points for purchases in a channel that competes with the owner's own channel. The only exception is a standalone coalition that earns a fee on every competing transaction and has no own margin to protect. If you do not earn when the competitor sells, do not reward the competitor.
The decision
This choice concerns whether a scheme should credit a purchase that takes place in a distribution corridor that competes with the programme owner's own sales path. The ruling question is not about generosity; it is about which party keeps the gross profit from the next buying occasion. A brand owned operation earns only when the shopper stays in its own path. A standalone coalition earns a fee no matter which path the shopper uses. Therefore the decision is whether the loyalty operation functions as an owner or as a neutral utility. If it is an owner, crediting a rival outlet hands margin to the opponent while creating a redemption debt. If it is a neutral utility, the same credit can succeed, provided the fee exceeds the debt.
What it costs you
An illustrative ledger shows the price. Suppose a household moves 1,000 dollars of monthly category spend away from your own store. Your usual gross profit at 25 per cent would have been 250 dollars. The opponent offers your operation a 15 per cent trading fee, or 150 dollars, for that volume. You issue 10 points per dollar, creating 10,000 points. At a redemption cost of one cent per point, honouring those points will later require 100 dollars. The operation keeps 50 dollars after the fee and the redemption debt, but the parent loses 250 dollars in gross profit. The combined effect is a 200 dollar loss on 1,000 dollars of spending, equal to 20 per cent of the original amount. If the same organisation were a coalition with no store to protect, that transaction would show a 50 dollar surplus. That difference is the real cost of rewarding an opposing outlet.
How to decide
Run this test on your own loyalty operation. Take the next 100 buys in one category and estimate how many would shift to an external selling location if you rewarded it equally to your own path. For each shifted buy, subtract the lost gross profit and the redemption cost, then add any trading fee that the outside seller pays. If the total is negative for an owner run programme, refuse to reward that location. If you run a standalone coalition with no owned path, use the same arithmetic but leave out the lost gross profit line. Reward outside locations only when the trading fee exceeds the redemption cost and the purchase level data returns to you. The test is not member affection. Members will accept any fresh earning chance. The test is whether the loyalty operation can afford to make them indifferent between paths.
What would change our mind
We would reverse this recommendation for an owner run programme if the parent brand closes its own selling path and becomes a pure loyalty issuer, because then there is no gross profit to protect and the outside seller fee is the only revenue. We would also reverse to yes if an outside seller pays a trading fee high enough to cover the redemption cost and the lost gross profit in full, which the ledger can measure. For a standalone coalition, we would reverse to no if purchase level data cannot be captured from outside sellers, because the coalition's worth depends on that data, or if the interchange fee falls below the redemption cost. These are observable contract terms.