Decisions · Partners and channel

How should a co-brand loyalty programme divide the economics

A co-brand programme should divide economics by paying the loyalty brand a fixed cents-per-point transfer price plus a small fixed fee per active account, with the issuer keeping all residual interchange, fee and lending income. This places redemption cost on the party that controls it and credit risk on the party that prices it.

The decision

The real choice is whether the brand sells points to the issuer at a fixed transfer price or takes a percentage of portfolio profit. Fixed transfer pricing is the better default. The mechanism is a schedule: issuer pays, say, 1.25 cents for every point earned, plus 24 dollars per active account per year. The brand does not share in interchange, annual fee revenue, interest income or credit losses. This aligns the brand with engagement and redemption quality, and leaves credit and funding decisions with the issuer.

What it costs you

The fixed transfer price makes the issuer's economics explicit and sometimes negative before lending income. As an illustration, suppose a card earns 2 points per dollar and the issuer pays 1.25 cents per point. Reward cost is 2.5 cents per dollar of spend. If interchange is 1.8 cents and a 99 dollar annual fee is spread over 30,000 dollars of annual spend, fee contribution is 0.33 cents per dollar. Total non-lending revenue is 2.13 cents, so the issuer loses 0.37 cents per dollar before funding and lending. On 30,000 dollars, that is a 111 dollar pre-funding loss. If 20 percent of points break and are never redeemed, effective reward cost falls to 1.0 cent per point, or 2.0 cents per dollar. The same account then earns 0.13 cents per dollar before funding, or 39 dollars. The brand meanwhile earns 0.35 cents per point if its redemption cost is 0.9 cents, giving 210 dollars on the 60,000 points issued. The fixed price therefore protects the brand and exposes the issuer to both redemption timing and credit margin.

How to decide

Test: Can the issuer recover the fixed transfer price, annual account fee and servicing cost from interchange, fee and lending income on a marginal account after breakage? If yes, sign fixed transfer. If no, lower the price or restrict earn rate rather than move to profit share. The reader should model a marginal new account, not the portfolio average, and run the calculation above at three annual spend levels: 10,000, 30,000 and 60,000 dollars. If the pre-funding loss disappears only at the highest level, the co-brand is mispriced for the majority of accounts.

What would change our mind

We would switch to a shared-profit structure only if the brand takes real credit or funding risk, such as guaranteeing a minimum loan yield or reimbursing charge-offs above a set rate. Without that risk transfer, profit share is just a royalty dressed as partnership. If regulation caps interchange or rewards costs in a way that makes fixed transfer prices unworkable, a regulated cost pass-through with independent audit would also be acceptable, but that is a change in the rule, not a preference.

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